Contradiction and Denial by Schlag, Pierre
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 6 
1989 
Contradiction and Denial 
Pierre Schlag 
University of Colorado School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pierre Schlag, Contradiction and Denial, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss6/5 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CONTRADICTION AND DENIAL 
Pierre Schlag* 
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES. By Mark Kelman. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. 360. $30. 
I have now written several drafts of a review of Mark Kelman's A 
Guide to Critical Legal Studies - each draft more unwieldy, more 
cumbersome than the previous one. 1 In each draft, I found myself, in 
good standard book review form, writing about (what Kelman writes 
about (what CLS scholars write about (what liberal legal thinkers 
write about (what they think they are doing (when they say they are 
doing (law)))))). Not only w:as it exceedingly difficult for me to keep 
the players and the plays straight, but I also had all sorts of difficulties 
keeping my subjects and direct objects in line. 
Very quickly my subjects started trying to do some impossible 
(often barely mentionable) things to my direct objects. Whenever I 
allowed the term "CLS" or "liberal legal thought" to occupy the sub-
ject space of the sentence for even a moment, it would invariably try to 
slam dance into the direct object, and I would invariably lose all lin-
guistic control. After a few invocations, these linguistic subjects 
"CLS" and "liberal legal thought" metamorphosed into metaphysical 
subjects, endowed with all the privileges appurtenant to that exalted 
status - privileges such as identity, constancy, integrity, unity, and 
many others that arguably each did not deserve. Soon these meta-
physical subjects took over entirely and began trying to displace each 
other by making all the usual metaphysical moves. 
And each time I finished a new draft, I ended up with yet another 
deeply caricatured description of CLS and liberal legal thought. Now, 
I have nothing against deep (or any other kind of) caricatures, but 
part of the purpose of caricatures is not simply to allow one to recog-
nize the pattern, but to recognize the pattern in the detail Somehow, 
where discussions of CLS are concerned, that last part seems to get 
lost, and very often CLS scholarship is reduced to some creaky ab-
straction like "contradiction/indeterminacy /legitimation." 
This was happening in my drafts too. I kept trying to write about 
Kelman's major theme: the view that standard legal thought is char-
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acterized both by the presence of contradiction and the denial or re-
pression of contradiction (pp. 2-3). I wanted to say two things about 
Kelman's double-edged theme. These two things were related (which 
was certainly a hopeful sign) - unfortunately, they were related para-
doxically (which arguably was not). 
The first thing: The reflexivity of legal thought is such that the 
question of whether standard legal thought denies or represses internal 
contradictions, as Kelman claims, is unlikely to yield an easy straight-
forward answer.2 
The second thing: Standard legal thought does in fact deny or re-
press contradiction in an easy, straightforward manner. 
* * * 
The longer version of these two things goes like this: Whether one 
agrees with Kelman's claim that standard legal thought represses its 
internal contradictions depends largely, I think, on the character of 
one's phenomenological experience of law and legal thought. In turn, 
that experience, whether contradicted or coherent, depends very much 
on how one understands the self-image of law and legal thought. In 
turn, for .people like us who are deeply implicated in the legal enter-
prise, the self-image of law and legal thought is in part a function of 
what we would like law and legal thought to be (and of course vice 
versa). All together, these observations about the reflexivity of law 
and legal thought caution that the question of whether standard legal 
thought denies or represses internal contradictions is unlikely to yield 
an easy, straightforward answer. 3 
Yet quite clearly, for standard legal thought, the answer is 
straightforward. Standard legal thought abhors contradiction. And it 
abhors paradox and incommensurability as well. In short, it abhors 
anything that it perceives as challenging its own self-image as an inte-
grated, self-sufficient mode of thought that is naturally entitled to ad-
judicate and organize the character of social life. Indeed, despite 
widespread substantive agreement that legal thought is not an autono-
mous branch of knowledge, 4 the form of most contemporary legal 
thought indicates exactly the opposite. 5 Most of us continue to write 
and think as if legal thought were autonomous, even as we busily repu-
diate legal formalism (over and over again). _ 
The continued entrapment of standard legal thought within the old 
2. For an elaboration, see Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the 
Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. R.Ev. 929 (1988). For a provocative discussion of contradiction in 
legal thought, see Carlson, Contradiction and Critical Legal Studies, CARDOZO L. R.Ev. 
(forthcoming). 
3. See Schlag, supra note 2. 
4. See, e.g., Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 761 (1987). 
5. See, ironically, id. at 766-69, 778. 
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forms of an autonomous body of knowledge is evidenced by the aston-
ishing alacrity and the relentless systematicness with which it rejects 
anything (such as contradiction) that might challenge its own auton-
omy. Even two decades of sustained contact with foreign disciplines 
like economics, philosophy and literature have failed to acquaint the 
legal mind with its lack of autonomy. On the contrary, the foreign 
disciplines were immediately confined to the space of the "Law and 
... "formula- where they were relegated to the subordinate role of 
supplying new content to replenish the structures of old legal forms. 
As the expert witness is to the litigator, so apparently are the liberal 
arts to legal scholarship. 
The almost complete subjugation of the foreign disciplines to the 
architectural needs of standard legal thought suggests that the legal 
mind is extraordinarily well equipped to overlook, deny, or repress 
even the most obvious and serious challenges to its own autonomy. 
And yet, in a paradoxical way (for it is only paradoxically that I can 
say this), the failure of standard legal thought to reckon seriously with 
these challenges is a failure of legal mind. 6 It is a failure of judgment, 
of self-awareness, of authenticity. 7 It is a failure of legal mind to take 
seriously its own reflexive character. Indeed, or rather paradoxically, 
standard legal thought offers a number of easy straightforward strata-
gems for the denial or repression of contradiction. Here are just a few. 
Subject-Object Reversals. Many legal scholars understand CLS 
claims of contradiction as an assertion that an object (here law and 
legal thought) partakes of a certain quality (here contradiction). In 
other words, the claim is understood to be that contradiction is part of 
the nature of law and legal thought. Accordingly, if a legal thinker is 
interested in determining whether the claims of contradiction are cor-
rect or not, he or she must determine whether this object called law 
and legal thought really does exist, and whether it really is contradic-
tory as claimed. 
I expect that, for some people, this way of thinking about CLS 
claims of contradiction seems perfectly sensible - indeed natural. It 
seems only natural to suppose that CLS claims of contradiction are 
about an object and that this object should have a nature or an identity 
- one that is independent of the observer's conception of that object. 
The major reason, however, that this way of thinking seems so natural 
is that it is pre-conscious projection. And yet, of course, once one 
makes these pre-conscious projections explicit (as I am doing now) 
6. See generally Vining, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief. 86 MICH. L. REV. 577 
(1987). 
7. A number of commentators from varying perspectives have recognized the degradation of 
the legal mind into mindless bureaucratic repetition of sterile legal forms. See, e.g., id.,· White, 
Intellectual Integration, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1987); Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 
MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985); Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal 
Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209, 211 (1986). 
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they hardly ~eem natural at all. For instance, the paragraph immedi-
ately above objectifies law and legal thought, radically separates this 
objectified vision of law and legal thought from the subject (the legal 
thinker), and externalizes contradiction in the object (law and legal . 
thought). 
Of course, once one makes this pre-conscious projection explicit it 
does not have much value as a denial stratagem. But if the radical 
separation, the objectification, and the externalization remain pre:..con-
scious, we have a terrific denial technique. For one thing, the exter-
nalization of contradiction in an objectified vision of law and legal 
thought spares the legal thinker from any recognition that his or her 
own thought processes might themselves be contradicted. This, of 
course, leaves the legal thinker fully confident in his or her ability to 
adjudicate the coherence (or lack thereof) of the legal system from a 
place that is itself free from doubt. More than that, however, if the 
legal thinker remains unaware of his or her pre-conscious projections 
of radical separation, objectification, and externalization, then he or 
she will invariably attribute those pre-conscious constructions fo the 
texts themselves. This yields an exquisite irony: the legal thinker 
never really confronts serious claims of contradiction because ·he or she 
pre-consciously reads into these claims. a view of subject-object rela-
tions that he or she (quite rightly) finds untenable on the conscious 
level. Thus, the claims of contradiction are never adequate and must 
always be rejected. What the legal thinker finds untenable, however, 
often turns out to be simply the pre-conscious constructions of the 
su~ject-object refation projected into somebody else's text. 
One can see this process of projection at work in Dworkin's chal-
lenge to CLS claims of contradiction. Says Dworkin: "Nothing is eas-
ier or more pointless than demonstrating that a flawed and 
contradictory account fits as well as a smoother and more attractive· 
ohe."8 The argument seems to be that you too, like CLS scholars, can 
see contradiction everywhere, but why on earth would you want to? 
Now there is some bite to this claim. But the question is what does it 
bite? If you ask me, it ends up biting its own tail. Rather uncannily, 
Dworkin's argument ultimately demonstrates the inadequacy of view-
ing legal theory as originating in a subject radically separate from its 
object. ' 
But first, note that Dworkin is partly ·right in attacking the CLS 
method of contradictions: if one is trying to sort the debris of the · 
world into theoretical categories, then choosing a contradictory cate-
gorization scheme (as opposed to a noncontradictory one) will facili-
tate the task greatly. Of course, Dworkin's objection can easily be 
turned against all sorts of traditional strategies for theory building -
including some of his own. For instance, consider these variations: 
8. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 274 (1986). 
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1. Nothing is easier or more pointless than demonstrating that an ex-
tremely abstract account fits as well as a smoother and more attractive 
one. 
2. Nothing is easier or more pointless than demonstrating that an ac-
count that severely restricts or truncates the data to be interpreted fits as 
well as a smoother and more attractive one. 
3. Nothing is easier or more pointless than demonstrating that an ac-
count that idealizes or sanitizes the hell out of the matters to be interpreted 
fits as well as a smoother and more attractive one. 
As these variations suggest, Dworkin's criticism has much broader 
possibilities than he imagines. In part, that is because the criticism is 
enabled not by any flaw in the targeted theory (CLS or any other) but 
by the implicit pre-conscious view of the targeted theory as a creation 
of a free subject radically separate from its object. If one is pre-con-
sciously prepared to see a certain theory as having its origin in a sub-
ject radically separate from its object, then one will always be able to 
claim that constructing such a theory is "easy" in the pejorative 
Dworkinian sense. The problem, of course, is that it will be equally 
"easy" to make that claim. Things are just getting easier all the time. 
Even the structure of the Subject-Object Reversal denial mecha-
nism is simple. Consciously, we all know that subject and object are 
not radically separate. Pre-consciously, however, we often use meta-
phors that succeed nonetheless in radically separating the two (for ex-
ample, inside/outside, here/there, etc.). When we project such crude 
and primitive views of subject-object relations onto the texts of others, 
we find (not surprisingly) that their texts are weak and flawed. The 
texts seem to contain views of subject-object relations that are simply 
untenable. Unfortunately, when we make this discovery, we are very 
often discovering something, not about the targeted theories, but 
about our own pre-conscious constructions.9 · Paradoxically, standard 
legal thought authorizes both the denial and the acknowledgment of 
this discovery. Denial is often easier. Acknowledgement is often more 
interesting. Both are sometimes appropriate. 
Grand Solipsistic Theory. Standard legal theory seems increasingly 
strained in its rhetorical efforts to marginalize contradiction, paradox, 
and the like. One particularly popular denial strategy entails the de-
velopment of a sort of "theoretical minimalism" where the criteria 
that theory sets up for the validation of law become so utterly unas-
suming in fact that, in an odd bow to Stanley Fish, these criteria are 
always already satisfied.1° For instance, given a suitably specified uni-
9. Actually, our conceptions of subject-object relations (both conscious and pre-conscious) 
are much more varied than this quick description indicates. For an excellent discussion of the 
role of metaphor in legal thought, see Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning 
and the Cognitive Stakes/or Law, 137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. (1989) (forthcoming). 
10. See Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1325 (1984). 
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verse, one gets the sense that virtually any state of affairs can be seen 
to conform with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.11 And try as one may, it still 
remains a mystery exactly what it is that is really ruled out by Dwor-
kin's invitation to try to make of the legal materials, the best they can 
be. 12 And in the valiant battle against the bureaucratization of law's 
empire, the great tradition of American pragmatism along with those 
wonderful pithy sayings like: "think[ ... ] not words,"13 or "[t]he life 
of the law has not been[ ... ]: it has been[ ... ],"14 can seem downright 
quaint ... not a little oxymoronic, ... maybe even a little nonreferen-
tial too. 
What I find disquieting about the advent of these theories is not so 
much that they are wrong. Rather, it is the prospect that in their ab-
straction, emptiness, and utter lack of ambition for the realization of 
justice or other social virtues, these theories may well be an accurate 
expression of the current character of standard legal thought. Indeed, 
in the rush to resolve important normative matters, standard norma-
tive theory systematically and willingly subordinates normative posi-
tions to purely aesthetic criteria like coherence, consistency, and 
elegance. 15 The result is that important social virtues Gustice, equal-
ity) are subordinated to the aesthetics of the scholarly legal text. One 
11. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (1986). 
12. See Dworkin, Law's Ambition for Itself, 71 VA. L. REv. 173, 177 (1985). For an elabora-
tion of the theme in the text, see Boyle, Legal Fiction (Book Review), 38 HAST. L. REV. 1013 
(1987). 
13. 0.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 238 (1921). 
14. o.w. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 1 (1881). Pragmatism has a great many things to 
recommend it, but one of them is not staying power. Indeed, the contemporary proponents of 
pragmatism are often not terribly pragmatic. 
Pragmatism encourages us to make sense of our world not from the perspective of some 
philosophical idealism or rationalism, but in terms of intuitive judgments based upon customs, 
traditions, and values embedded in the social context. See Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of 
Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1878 (1988). This is great stuff, but it does pose some 
problems. One problem, of course, is that in our context it is precisely this sense that there are 
customs, traditions, and values embedded in the social context that is experienced as disappear-
ing. Instead, we have the powerful rationalizing practices of bureaucracy and the market. So 
either the pragmatic invitation to look to context is a little vacant or it is an invitation to surren-
der to whatever customs, traditions, and values the market and bureaucracy produce. My sense 
is that the invitation to pragmatism is both, and that the cu"ent conceptual vacancy of the 
pragmatic approach is precisely what allows bureaucracy and the market to determine its miss-
ing content and structure. · 
As if in confirmation, one often gets the sense that all the bold calls for a pragmatic renais-
sance in legal scholarship are just a glossy public relations cover for the promotion of the highly 
stylized rhetoric of the lawyer's brief. Adoption of such a rhetoric in legal scholarship leaves 
something to be desired. For one thing, it ~eaves legal academics without much to do other than 
cheer or hiss the courts from the sidelines. Do it again, do it again, we like it, we like it? See id. 
at 1879. For another- and I know this is reaching wildly- it just may be that legal academics 
are not the best equipped or the best situated individuals to participate in fostering the pragmatic 
enterprise. See id. Of course, I could be wrong about all this. But I don't think so. You check it 
out. See Farber, Legal Pragmatism and The Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988). 
15. These aesthetic virtues may have some implicit connection to substantive virtues like 
justice, but I have not seen any good arguments to that effect lately. Still, one wonders whether 
there is a plausible vision of how history is made that could possibly support such a connection. 
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might even begin to wonder what the social significance of this sort of 
scholarship really is: The promotion of justice and the social virtues, 
or the maintenance of rationalist form in legal thought? 
Entrenching Contradiction. Entrenching contradictions by giving 
them a fiat ontological status is another way of denying contradiction. 
This approach simply makes peace with contradiction by according 
specific contradictions a fiat, universal ontological role. Once a con-
tradiction is universalized as intellectually intractable and historically 
invariant, it becomes a given, an aspect of the fixed background, the 
stage. No longer an actor, it loses its privileged relation to the action 
and is thus stripped of its creative intellectual force. 
I have not seen this denial stratagem used in standard legal 
thought. It seems to be more popular among CLS scholars. 16 It is not 
clear to me, however, why this stance should seem appealing to CLS 
scholars, if it is at all. Attributing a universal ontological status to 
specific contradictions may appear to be radical and destabilizing (es-
pecially when everyone else worships at the altar of coherence). But 
despite these appearances, such depictions are likely to succeed only in 
enveloping contradiction in the secure stability and the comfortable 
coherence of the monistic form. 
Sectorization. According to William James, the appropriate scho-
lastic response to a contradiction is to make a distinction.17 In con-
temporary legal thought, this response translates into the claim that if 
one pays sufficient respect to the jurisdictional scope - the sectors -
within which ostensibly conflicting doctrines are supposed to apply, 
then one will find that the conflicts really are illusory. Instead, the 
doctrines are safely contained within their own limited fields of 
application. 
This stratagem for the denial of contradiction seems to be a hybrid 
of Zeno's paradox and marginal analysis. The idea behind sectoriza-
tion, I suppose, is that if one produces distinctions at a rate marginally 
faster than the production of contradiction, then the sum of these 
curves will always yield coherence, not contradiction. This is a great 
denial strategy, and it would work just fine except for one thing: it is 
hardly self-evident that the production of distinction and the produc-
tion of contradictiOn are independent functions. 18 
Theoretieal Unmentionables. Theoretical unmentionables are an-
other way of containing the recognition of contradiction within man-
ageable proportions. Any theory or mode of thought has certain gaps, 
holes, and absences that, by virtue of the internal constitution of the 
16. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes (Book Review), 41 
STAN. L. REv. 751, 783 (1989) (noting that male CLS scholars suggest that the fundamental 
contradiction is part of human nature). 
17. W. JAMES, EssAYS IN PRAGMATISM 141 (1948). 
18. See Schlag, supra note 2. 
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theory or mode of thought, cannot be articulated in positive terms. 19 
Sometimes these gaps, holes, and absences bear names and thus appear 
to have integrity and substance, even though, by definition or by the-
ory, nothing positive can be said about them. These, then, are theoreti-
cal unmentionables, those wonderful theoretical spaces that we are 
quite sure exist, but that by virtue of the constitution of the theory we 
cannot say very much about. All theories and modes of thought have 
them. A major distinction among theories and modes of thought, 
however, is how rapidly they resort to· the invocation of theoretical 
unmentionables to resolve potential difficulties like contradiction, par-
adox, and incommensurability. 
From this perspective, God is no doubt the all-time champion the-
oretical unmentionabie. Featured in the same role today are some 
more secular derivatives including pragmatism, practical reason, good 
judgment, discretion, and balancing. Contradictions can be denied by 
referring them for resolution to the social/conceptual space identified 
by these theoretical unmentionables. The unmentionables will gener-
~y work fine until one of three things happens: 
1. Somebody actually tries to say something .about the structure and 
content of these theoretical unmentionables, ... in which case they be-
come theoretically very mentionable. They acquire a positive content, a 
structural identity, and thus become subject to the very same contradic-
tions that caused their parent discourse to produce them in the fir.st 
place. Or, 
2. Somebody points out that these theoretical unmentionables really 
are unmentionable and that accordingly, their explanatory power is, uh 
well, somewhat limited. Or, 
3. The theoretical unmentionables are renamed and perhaps ev~n 
reconceptualized in a way that the original purveyors of the terms do not 
like. Theoretical unmentionables are especially vulnerable to this sort of 
thing because their internal structure and content is, ... unmentionable. 
Just as an example: "pragmatic craft" can become "good judgment," . · 
which can become "good sense," which can become "great karma." The . 
point is that the people who think they have really said something in the 
statement, "Mr. Justice Brandeis showed great pragmatic craft" would 
be probably be somewhat displeased to hear this translated as "Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis had terrific karma." But really: pragmatic craft/terrific 
karma - what's the difference? (It's not that there isn't any - it's just 
that I'd like to see it explained.) 
* * * 
On the whole I think standard legal thought greatly underesti-
mates the extent to which its discourses are internally contradictory, 
incommensurable, and paradoxical. And apart from the fact of denial, 
19. See Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37 
(1987). 
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there is no great surprise or mystery about the sources of this denial. 
On the contrary, given th~ multiplicity of available contradictory dis-
courses, denial is vastly overdetermined. 
